The European Union (EU) and Azerbaijan have negotiated three different agreements for a new legal basis underpinning their relationship since 2010. Whereas the EU tries to adhere to a more unilateral approach, Azerbaijan wants cooperation to take place on a more inclusive, dialogical, basis. The essay will present a model of 'bargaining power' to analyse how the Azerbaijani government has tried to enforce this, and to what degree it has been successful. It finds that the bargaining power model can explain some of the changing power dynamics in EU-Azerbaijan relations, and that these might speak to the broader Eurasian region too.
in recent years there has been discussion over the future of relations, in particular the limits to cooperation as well as the legal foundation for these relations.
Relations between the EU and Azerbaijan are presently conducted within the Eastern Partnership framework (EaP) (EC 2010b) , which involves political and economic cooperation between the EU on the one hand, and Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan on the other (EC 2010b, p. 6) Union instead (Gardner 2013; Eurasian Economic Commission 2015) . The Azerbaijani government initially their embassies in Baku, the European Commission and the European Parliament are included in the analysis to the extent that their bilateral contacts with Azerbaijan are relevant to the overall EU-led negotiations on this subject. 'Azerbaijan', in turn, refers to the elements of the Azerbaijani government conducting negotiations with the EU. These are often the highest-level officials, including the president, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and members of the presidential administration. There are naturally more actors involved;
however, for the sake of clarity this essay only examines bilateral relations at the executive level.
2 Interview with European affiliate 3, Brussels, 2014. For reasons of confidentiality, all names and positions of interviewees have been omitted. Interviewees will only be referred to by their broad affiliation ('European', referring to EU institutions as well as national member states; Azerbaijani establishment; or independent expert) in addition to the date of the interview.
3 Interview with European affiliate 3, July 2014.
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'Georgia ratifies EU association agreement', RFE/RL, 18 July 2014, available at:
http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia-eu-association-agreement-ratification-parliament/25461441.html, accessed 2 October 2014. The AAs would at a later stage be complemented by a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) (EC 2008, p. 4) . In the case of relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, only the negotiations over the AA are relevant, since the country is not eligible to start DCFTA negotiations until it becomes a WTO member (see also ECFR 2013; Gstöhl 2015, p. 863) .
started the negotiations with the EU for an AA but decided against it in 2013, wanting instead a tailor-made policy adjusted to its own interests and objectives. It therefore proposed two alternative frameworks: first, the Strategic Modernisation Partnership (SMP) in 2013, which the EU soon dismissed; and second, in 2015, the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The latter was taken into consideration by the EU, and negotiations commenced in 2016. Initially this seemed a bargaining victory for Azerbaijan, considering the unprecedented nature of the situation, with a partner state proposing such initiative, and Baku's assertive tone. However, since 2016 the EU and the Azerbaijani government have been involved in a negotiation process that required concessions and at times pragmatism, as will be set out in the analysis later on in this essay.
The essay makes two main contributions. First, it will add to the literature on EU external relations and the limits to the EU's transformative power by analysing the actions and interests of a third country, namely
Azerbaijan, rather than only seeking explanations for the EU's reduced influence in the EU's own behaviour and motives. The second contribution to the literature will be an insight into how Azerbaijan has been a forerunner in resisting the EU's agenda. In the past few years, several other smaller states in the region have followed its example, albeit in a more moderate way (for example, Armenia and Belarus). Relations between Brussels and Baku are therefore particularly interesting because they appear to be illustrative of a broader change in power dynamics between the EU and neighbouring countries. While the EU still adheres to a largely EU-centred agenda for relations with its Eastern neighbours, Azerbaijan only wants close cooperation with the EU on its own terms (Van Gils 2018). Azerbaijan is not the only country to desire a more equal relationship with the EU, but it stands out because it has openly challenged the state of affairs. The Azerbaijani government has tried to alter negotiation practices, to move from a unilateral to a more dialogical decision-making process. Yet since 2013, when the AA was rejected, there have been several remarkable shifts in the negotiation dynamics. At times, Baku seems to have been successful in reaching its aim; yet in other stages of the negotiations the EU has re-established itself as the main actor. The question arises: how can these dynamics be explained? A possible answer might be found in the concept of 'bargaining power', which captures both the EU's and Azerbaijan's material and immaterial sources of power. As such, the case of Azerbaijan is simultaneously both an outlier and an illustration of a larger, upcoming change in the region, and can thus help us to understand the mechanisms of resistance to the EU's policies by smaller states in the EU's neighbourhood. One would expect this to lead to an increase in the level of partnership and reciprocity in relations, yet what can be observed is that the policy remains mostly unilaterally set by the EU, without regard for the interests and perceptions of Azerbaijan. This essay finds that, in response, the Azerbaijani government tries to influence the policy-making process and even to hinder the implementation of EU policies that are not in its interests. Third, the essay will argue that the institutional architecture of relations should be re-considered, and perhaps (gradually)
move from an EU-dominated agenda to a more inclusive one. The research 6 presented here is therefore situated in the broader framework of the EU's changing external relations, and possible obstacles to the EU's desired transformative effect.
The following section will discuss each of the three agreements that have been negotiated since 2010:
from the discussion and rejection of the AA to the proposal of the SMP and the negotiations over the SPA since 5 Expert interview 1, July 2014. 6 The analysis is based on the investigation of a range of sources, including policy documents, newspaper archives, and other secondary literature. Secondary sources were integrated by a total of 25 interviews, conducted in 2014, 2015, 2017 in both Baku and Brussels. Twelve respondents were representatives of or affiliated with the different EU institutions and national member states; six were representatives of or affiliated with the government of Azerbaijan; and seven interviewees were independent experts. While the number of interviews is rather limited, they provided comprehensive information, as demonstrated by the fact that a point of data saturation was reached whereby the interviews turned up the same or similar information..
2015. Subsequently, the essay will present a model of bargaining power as a conceptual framework to answer the main question about changing negotiation dynamics. Next, the essay will analyse these negotiations in light of the different elements of this model. Lastly, in the conclusion, the essay will reflect on the significance of these findings for relations between the EU and the broader emerging Eurasian space.
Negotiations over three agreements
Between 2010 and 2017, three different agreements were negotiated as possible follow-ups to the PCA. What follows is a brief discussion of the context of these subsequent negotiations and the proposed agreements. The aim of this section is to shed light on the unique situation posed by these developments.
Association Agreement (2010 Agreement ( -2013 As was discussed in the introduction, after 2010 the EU aimed to sign an AA with Azerbaijan. Association
Agreements have the aim of bringing partner states' legislation in a number of policy areas in line with the EU's standards (Della Sala in Dutkiewicz & Sakwa 2015, p. 167) . Signing an AA would effectively update the legal basis for bilateral relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, which would facilitate deeper political and economic cooperation (EC 2010c) .
Negotiations between the EU and Azerbaijan on the AA started in July 2010 (EC 2010c) . The EU identified a number of chapters that did not require any negotiations, since both parties were already aligned in a number of areas, including, for instance, energy and technical cooperation. 7 Negotiations on the other chapters proved more difficult. First of all, the EU had a mostly regional policy framework in mind, whereas Azerbaijan wanted a more differentiated framework that represented its own interests better. Furthermore, AAs have a strong transformative dimension, in that they aim at significant political and economic reform in the partner states (EU Council 2014). This normative dimension can also be seen in the EU's policies towards the post-Soviet region more broadly, as demonstrated by Siddi and Vilpisauskas in their respective contributions to this collection of essays. As a consequence, the Baku government perceived that the agenda was set mostly unilaterally by the EU and did not sufficiently include Azerbaijani interests. Specifically, the two key issues at stake in the negotiations over all three suggested agreements have been the inclusion of a political and values dimension (desired by the EU, in line with its transformative objectives) and that of a stronger reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Azerbaijan's wish, based on the belief that more active EU engagement would benefit the conflict resolution process).
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The Azerbaijani government has indicated numerous times that while it seeks in-depth cooperation with the EU it has no interest in extensive integration through further institutionalisation of relations. This lack of interest is predominantly based on the country's (economic) independence, its relations with Russia, and Baku's reluctance to include the transmission of values as part of the relationship (Babayev 2014, pp. 61-2) . The government only wants to cooperate on the following three conditions: any integration must be on equal terms;
there must be economic benefits; and Azerbaijan must be able to influence the decision-making process in bilateral relations. 9 These conditions were not met in the AA negotiations, which made Baku reconsider the partnership in Furthermore, the SMP would largely follow the lines of the EaP but exclude the parts on 'democratization, human 8 The EU refers to the OSCE Minsk Group as having the official mandate for the conflict resolution process, and therefore does not wish to become engaged in the process itself, other than through an indirect role as a supporter of the Mink Group's efforts. The Azerbaijani government, however, wants the EU to take on a more active role, as it has no confidence that the OSCE Mink Group has the will or capacity to solve the conflict in a manner beneficial to Azerbaijan's interests. The EU's position in this regard conflicts somewhat with its stated desire to become a regional security actor and its commitment to regional security cooperation recorded in the ENP and EaP (Freire & Simão 2013, p. 465) . While resolving the conflict would benefit the EU, as regional stability is in its immediate interest (Nuriyev 2008) , involvement would also be a delicate matter considering that both Azerbaijan and Armenia are partners of the EU, and Russia would likely not approve of the EU's involvement.
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rights and freedoms'. 11 A SMP would thus allow Azerbaijan to be selective in the areas of cooperation, 12 and lead to less cooperation rather than more, as opposed to the AA. 13 Apart from largely omitting the value-based dimension of an AA, the SMP would further differ from such agreement in that Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, would be mentioned (Rettman 2013 Again, the objectives from both sides were to increase cooperation, and again, the contested issue was whether or not to include chapters referring to values and to Nagorno-Karabakh. 25 Initially, the fact that the EU was prepared to consider the proposal seemed a bargaining victory for Azerbaijan. However, in the course of negotiations, the European Union managed to convince Azerbaijan to include a chapter on democracy and human rights, 26 an important goal for Brussels. With the negotiations still ongoing at the time of writing (Gotev 2018) , it is unclear as yet whether Azerbaijan can successfully put the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the agenda. The
Azerbaijani side has stated that the inclusion of references to the conflict is crucial.
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In July 2018 the EU and the Azerbaijani government signed a document called the Partnership Priorities, which, as it replaces the current ENP Action Plan (EC 2018a), can be seen as a step towards setting the agenda for cooperation until the legal basis for relations is updated. The priorities listed for cooperation in the next few years represent the EU's as well as Azerbaijan's interests but show that the EU has been the most successful of the two in advocating its own interests: the first priorities listed relate to 'good governance, the rule of law and human rights', and the functioning of civil society is mentioned multiple times (EC 2018b). Priorities of more interest to the Azerbaijani government concern economic diversification and energy trade, as well as the implementation of the Mobility Partnership (EC 2018b). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not mentioned in the document at all, however (EC 2018b), even though the conflict was raised by government officials in most, if not all, official meetings with the EU in the year preceding the signing of the document. 28 While Partnership Priorities are not legally binding and could therefore be seen as less important to the Azerbaijani government, it is nonetheless telling that the authorities in Baku have agreed to sign these priorities without the document containing any references to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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It is thus clear that the SPA, at least initially, established a clear tendency towards a more dialogical form of negotiations, yet the negotiations reverted to a more unilateral tendency from 2016, as reflected in the 2018
Partnership Priorities document. The next section will introduce a conceptual framework to help us unpack the dynamics of these negotiations, to understand whether, why and how the two parties managed to successfully defend their interests.
A new model of bargaining power to assess negotiation dynamics
This brief overview suggested that negotiations over all three agreements have revolved around similar issues: the EU seeks to secure a political and values dimension in each agreement, while Azerbaijan wants more dialogical, rather than unilateral, negotiations, to ensure representation of its own interests, namely less attention on the values dimension and a more prominent position for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The desire for more dialogical relations seems unnecessary when looking at the official narrative.
Bilateral relations between the EU and Azerbaijan are officially founded on partnership, a core concept in the EaP (Korosteleva 2011) . It is argued that genuine partnership should consist of reciprocity in relations: attention to the interests and policy priorities of both actors (Weber et al. 2007) , and joint ownership of the policy (Korosteleva 2011, p. 5; Khasson 2013, p. 334 ). In theory there should be equal input from the EU and Azerbaijan in their bilateral relations. Yet in practice, while the relationship has certainly developed in that direction to an extent, we observe that the proposed policies, and therefore the negotiation practices, remain very one-sided. Azerbaijan views itself as an equal if not stronger partner than the EU (Franke et al. 2010 ) and therefore disagrees with the EU-centred policies and the EU's tendency to dictate policy rather than engage in dialogue.
What makes this situation so unique is that in the case of the SMP and SPA, it is the first time a non-EU actor has proposed an agreement rather than the EU taking the initiative. 30 Moreover, the EU's readiness to negotiate the SPA is in stark contrast to its unwillingness to discuss the SMP, while the two agreements themselves do not substantially differ. After Azerbaijan's initial successes, Brussels now appears to have the stronger position in the negotiations again. Azerbaijan is assertive and does not accept the status quo, while the European Union is not used to being confronted in this way by its smaller partners. Regarding a follow-up agreement for the PCA, both actors are thus actively seeking to promote their own interests.
How can we explain the changing dynamics in negotiations between the EU and the Azerbaijani government over a follow-up to the PCA in this rather rare case of EU external relations? The concept of bargaining power may prove useful to address this question. As a concept borrowed from negotiation and conflict mediation literature (see e.g. Jervis 1976; Zartman and Rubin 2002), bargaining power is here understood as the ability to influence the outcome of relations to one's own benefit, either through the ability to affect the policymaking process or through the capacity to curb the competitive influence of other actors. 31 The notion of bargaining power has been applied in the context of the EU's external relations in a limited number of studies (Zartman 1978; Elgström & Jöhnsson 2005) . The concept is often used to study EU decision-making processes or fixed-stage negotiation processes in international politics. 32 By viewing the policy-making process as a form of negotiation, it becomes possible to take into account all actors involved, and to capture both their input and the other parties' response to that input, allowing us to assess both what enables and what prevents actors from exerting influence in political relations. The innovation here is that the concept is used to analyse an ongoing process of 'interdependent decision-making' (Sjöstedt in Goldmann & Sjöstedt 1979, p. 279) between two parties on an international level, in a non-linear process with no clearly defined stages, start or end point, as opposed to, for example, negotiations on conflict resolution or clearly defined scenarios for international bargaining. Using the concept in this way has the advantage of granting the EU and Azerbaijan equal analytical relevance. Usually EU external relations are only studied from the EU perspective. For instance, the external governance approach is very helpful in categorising relations between the EU and partner countries in terms of forms of cooperation and levels of EU influence (Lavenex 2004; Börzel 2010) , 33 but it has several limitations compared to bargaining power in the context of this study. While this approach allocates space for the partner states in the outcome of the process, the centre of the analysis is still the EU's position and behaviour, and it is still assumed that the EU can choose for, or decide upon, a specific form of governance in relations with an external actor. Governance can thus only explain the EU's policies, not Azerbaijan's resistance to them. Also, the existing literature on external governance mostly looks at policy outcomes rather than policy-making, while this essay aims to unpack the very process of negotiation and bargaining in EU-Azerbaijan relations. Similar limitations apply to the notion of 'decentring'. Bechev and Nicolaïdis assess how relations between the EU and neighbouring countries can be improved by allocating a greater role to the partner states in designing and implementing the policies (Bechev & Nicolaïdis 2010, pp. 490-91) . The desire for decentring certainly captures the Azerbaijani government's motivation for its aims and actions in relations with the EU, but is not useful in understanding the actual process of bringing about a more decentred modus operandi.
Therefore, the bargaining power concept will be applied to shed light on the interaction between the EU and Azerbaijan and to understand why and how power dynamics changed during the course of this interaction.
The notion can give us insight into the strategies and instruments used by Baku and Brussels to influence the policy-making process. It may illuminate the ways in which the Azerbaijani government tries to make negotiations more dialogical and the measures taken by the EU to secure its dominant position. To analyse bargaining power in EU-Azerbaijan relations, five core aspects have been identified as particularly relevant. Some of these have a material basis (the power base); others are non-tangible in nature (negotiation skills and capacity as well as perceptions of the Self and Other) or refer to non-material considerations affecting an actor's room for manoeuvre (domestic context and available alternatives). The analysis uses an interpretivist approach and the five elements 33 The concept defines a form of relationship between the EU and third countries in which the EU can exert a certain influence in a non-accession framework (Lavenex 2004, p. 680) . Different modes of external governance have been conceptualised, including 'hierarchical governance', when relations are top-down and mostly determined by the EU rather than based on equal input from both sides (Börzel 2010, p. 191, 198) ; and 'network governance', whereby views of all actors involved are taken into account (Pierre and Peters 2000, p. 19).
Korosteleva argues that genuine partnership should go even a step further, and not be based on governance but on genuinely equal cooperation (Korosteleva 2011) .
are not to be seen as independent variables but rather as dimensions that all contribute to a broader picture of the interaction during negotiations.
The first element is the actors' power base, the most material form of power in the bargaining power model. The European Union traditionally enjoys an asymmetry in relations with smaller neighbouring and candidate countries; in the case of Azerbaijan, there seems to be a more symmetrical relationship or at least a less asymmetrical mode than in relations with other states in the Eastern Partnership. This power base has played out differently over time, as will be shown in the empirical segments of this essay. Notably, between 2010 and 2015, oil prices were high and Azerbaijan's economy boomed; the 2016 economic downturn naturally affected the country's power base in a negative manner. The second important element of bargaining power is negotiation skill and capacity. Diplomacy, lobbying and winning political support can all be put under this category (Goldmann 1979, p. 29; Melissen 2005) . Both the EU and Azerbaijan have used this element extensively with regards to the AA, SMP and SPA negotiations. Azerbaijan is an unusual partner for the EU in that it has a comparatively strong diplomatic body for the country's size and its relatively young statehood. This relative strength seems to play out favourably for Baku in relations with Brussels. A third element of an actor's bargaining power is the domestic context, which sets which boundaries and expectations for the negotiation process (Turner in Putnam & Roloff 1992, p. 233) . 34 Relevant variables can be opportunities, internal legitimacy, consensus among EU member states, and tensions between institutions on a (supra)national level. Fourth, perceptions of the Self and Other are crucial to an actor's bargaining power. Perceptions of the Self are important because of the domestic dimension:
negotiators have to behave in accordance with the role and expectations that they consider to apply to themselves as an actor. Perceptions of the Other, in turn, legitimise certain actions or policies towards other actors (Diez 2005, p. 629) . The fifth and last element of bargaining power model is the attractiveness of alternative options. The availability of alternatives also potentially affects the receptiveness of partner countries to EU influence and viceversa; having alternatives affects the offers an actor makes in negotiations since there is less need to compromise (Tutzauer in Putnam & Roloff 1992, p. 73) . Alternative options may also affect the perception of the Self.
Importantly, some facets of these five elements may overlap or may be interlinked. For instance, domestic factors will also inform an actor's perception of the Self and may influence its negotiation skills. An actor's power base directly influences its negotiation capacity too, whereas the availability of alternatives can be dependent on the perception of the Self and the Other.
34 See also Iklé (1985 Iklé ( [1964 , p. 122).
What we expect to find on the basis of this bargaining power model is that increased bargaining power for Azerbaijan would allow its government to enforce more dialogical forms of decision-making, to be measured by representation of its main priorities, namely, more attention on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and less emphasis on values promotion. More bargaining power for the European Union would facilitate in turn the continuation of more unilateral modes of negotiation, resulting in a strong values-promotion dimension to a negotiated agreement, and less commitment to engage directly in conflict resolution regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.
Bargaining power and the negotiations over time
When applying the bargaining power model to the negotiations over the AA, SMP and SPA, we find that the five elements have a clear role in explaining the negotiation dynamics.
Power base
The power base-the actors' material sources of power-is less asymmetrical than could be expected on the basis of Azerbaijan's population, territory and GDP in comparison to those of the EU. Two key factors are energy and the subsequent economic interdependence between the two sides (Nuriyev 2008; Gahramanova 2009 ).
While both actors are economically independent, there is at the same time a great interdependency between Brussels and Baku. Azerbaijan's energy is sought by the European Union, in particular as a means of diversifying supply and reducing its reliance on Russia, while Azerbaijan needs the EU as a customer for this energy (European Commission 2015a). 35 In absolute numbers, the trade balance remains in favour of the EU, but energy is a valuable asset for Azerbaijan, as demonstrated by the repeated references to the country's importance in EU in official documents and statements (European Commission 2015a). 36 Therefore, we can still speak of a certain power balance in terms of economic interdependence. Simultaneously, energy plays an indirect role in the bargaining power model in that it facilitates self-reliance for Azerbaijan; in other words, the EU's model of financial conditionality as a means for political reform will not be effective with regard to Azerbaijan (Simão 2012, p. 198) . This higher degree of mutual dependence has placed Baku in a much more solid bargaining position compared to other states in negotiations over a follow-up agreement to the PCA. Between 2010 and 2015,
Azerbaijan enjoyed economic growth amidst worldwide economic contraction, including in the EU, where the economic growth figure briefly went negative during the 2008 financial crisis and only slowly recovered after (World Bank 2017a , 2017b . This relative symmetry might explain why Azerbaijan felt able to reject the AA and to propose an alternative agreement. Moreover, the EU's weakened position likely reduced its attraction for cooperation and legal approximation for partners, as it had less to offer in economic terms, than previously (Kavalski 2012, p. 84) .
This balance has altered, however, since the economic downturn that hit Azerbaijan in 2015, following a drop in oil prices worldwide.
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The country's economy relies on energy revenues for over 65% (Jafarli 2016) and in December 2015 the government was forced to unpeg the Azerbaijani manat from the US dollar (Agayev 2015) and to devaluate the currency by 32% (Farchy 2015) . The resulting inflation led to small-scale protests 38 and forced the government to intervene over bread prices in an attempt to maintain domestic stability (Salimova 2016 ). The Azerbaijani government realised that a diversification of its economy was necessary, and received support from the EU for this. 39 Azerbaijan's reduced economic independence diminished the country's power base, which in turn may have affected the negotiation dynamics. Moreover, the EU's need for energy diversification lessened as oil prices fell. Import of Azerbaijani goods into the EU declined by more than 28% in
2016, and EU exports to Azerbaijan dropped even further, by over 45% (European Commission DG Trade 2017).
This likely places the EU in a more favourable bargaining position, as possibly evidenced by the fact that Baku agreed in 2017 to include a chapter on democracy and human rights into the latest agreement under negotiation.
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In short, until 2015, economic interdependence meant that the EU and Azerbaijan were negotiating from similar power bases. The post-2015 economic downturn diminished Azerbaijan's power base relative to the EU, altering in turn the negotiation dynamics in favour of Brussels.
Negotiation skill and capacity
As a large and experienced negotiator, the European Union naturally outweighs Azerbaijan in terms of negotiation skill and capacity. Yet, one of the features that makes Azerbaijan stand out in the post-Soviet region is its While the AA and SMP were being negotiated simultaneously, both sides appeared to have similar bargaining power: the negotiations, as a consequence, ended in a deadlock. Goldmann's distinction between offensive and defensive power (Goldmann in Goldmann and Sjöstedt 1979) 57 suggests that neither side had the offensive power to successfully change the agenda; all they could do was to apply their defensive power by postponing negotiations and rejecting proposed agreements. Yet at first sight, the fact that the EU was willing to negotiate the SPA, and that the EEAS seemed to be taking this proposal much more seriously than it did the SMP, points to Azerbaijan's increased bargaining power. The 2015 downturn may have changed these dynamics, however, leaving Azerbaijan in a more vulnerable position; for instance, having to make concessions on the values dimension, as described earlier. It is too early to tell how this new dynamic has affected the use of specific negotiation strategies. Overall, the government's tactics have not changed. However, following the 2017
Laundromat scandal, the government's lobbying attempts have been brought into disrepute, which may have led to the reduced effectiveness of such a strategy; furthermore, lobbying in the policy world is costly and the economic downturn may have affected the government's ability to finance such activities (Van Gils 2018).
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'Azerbaijan continues independent, multidimensional, balanced and active foreign policy in 2017', AzerTac, 28 December 2017, available at: https://azertag.az/en/xeber/1125089, accessed 7 September 2018.
56 See for instance the group's event calendar: https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/o/the-european-azerbaijan-
society-teas-1348104131
57 Offensive power is power in which A can chose to make B do something; defensive power is possessed by B and refers to the situation in which A cannot succeed to make B do something (Goldmann in Goldmann & Sjöstedt 1979, pp. 13-4) .
Domestic context
The domestic context plays an important role in determining the two actors' priorities-values promotion (EU) and the agenda-setting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Azerbaijan). These priorities can be related to the EU's and Azerbaijani government's support bases.
The issues of legitimacy and constituency are interpreted differently by the Azerbaijani government and EU institutions, mostly as the former has a more direct relation to its citizens than the latter do towards the 28 EU member states. Supranational actors (EEAS, the EU Delegation in Baku, the European Parliament and the European Commission) need to take into consideration the viewpoints and interests of the member states, which in turn have their own respective constituencies in the form of citizens and electorate.
One of the main concerns of the Azerbaijani government is maintaining legitimacy on a domestic level, to ensure regime survival and resilience (Dimitrov 2013) : its behaviour in negotiations over the agreements is immediately affected by this necessity. For the EU, legitimacy is a more indirect and longer-term asset, yet its credibility both at domestic and international levels is equally crucial. As will be shown in the following section on perceptions, credibility and roles significantly affect the EU's behaviour in relations with Azerbaijan. Both sides are as such similarly restrained in their room for manoeuvre by domestic pressures and their anticipation of potential threats to their legitimacy or credibility. Closely connected to these domestic priorities is the fact that signing the AA was not a viable option for Azerbaijan. As mentioned above, one of the points of disagreement over the AA as well as the SMP was the manner in which they referred to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since resolving the conflict is a national priority, having the matter included in any future agreement signed with the EU is crucial to the Azerbaijani government's internal legitimacy.
Securing this legitimacy could also be a factor in the government's preference to hold SPA negotiations in Baku rather than in Brussels.Whereas the AA and SMP were discussed in various locations, the first SPA negotiations were held in Baku, with the government letting the EEAS delegation wait for an invitation to come to Baku, after the issue of the European Parliament's resolution on human rights in Azerbaijan. This move reflected Azerbaijan's strong bargaining power position at the time. In February 2017 President Aliyev did go to Brussels, although he cancelled a meeting with the European Parliament because it was hosting an event on human rights in Azerbaijan. 58 After the European Parliament's September 2015 resolution on human rights issues in Azerbaijan, the government made the EEAS delegation wait for an invitation to come to Baku for the first SPA negotiations. This reflected Azerbaijan's bargaining power at the time. When President Aliyev went to Brussels in February 2017, he cancelled a meeting with the Parliament because it was hosting an event on human rights in Azerbaijan. Such national assertion in the matter of negotiating the SPA may have served to enhance the government's domestic legitimacy, too.
The European Union's options to negotiate the SMP with Azerbaijan were limited because the member states had only given the EU a mandate to negotiate an AA. 59 At the same time, the EEAS also realised that if negotiations over the AA were to remain deadlocked, there would be a point at which the member states would request a change of mandate. 60 While the EEAS did not have a mandate to negotiate the SMP alongside the AA, it did obtain a mandate for the SPA in 2016 (EU Council 2016). The domestic context may also shape the EU's preference for a regional approach over individual country agreements, with the EU aspiring to further regional integration in the South Caucasus (Babayev 2014, p. 108) . This preference for a regional approach could also be a result of the fact that the EU member states simply could not reach consensus on a country-specific policy towards Azerbaijan, considering that they have different interests at stake and cooperate with Baku to varying degrees, and therefore continued to advocate the AA, which did have such regional rather than country-specific focus. The Council's decision to provide a mandate for the SPA negotiations in 2016 will be explained in the next section on perceptions.
For both the EU and the Azerbaijani government, domestic factors thus played a significant role in determining whether or not the proposed agreements were acceptable. It appears that the disagreement over the reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to values led to the discontinuation of negotiations over both the AA and the SMP. It remains to be seen how the two actors will include these issues in negotiations over the SPA, as the negotiations are still on-going at the time of writing. 
Perceptions of the Self and Other
Perceptions and misperceptions appear to be a powerful influence in negotiations over the AA, SMP and SPA.
Interestingly, both actors have perceived themselves to be more powerful than the other. That the EU thinks of itself as the strongest actor is probably not surprising. Azerbaijan's perception of itself as insufficiently acknowledged is more striking, especially in comparison to other, less assertive states in the EaP. This notion seems to have played a key role in the AA negotiations in particular. Azerbaijan has a strong desire for acknowledgement and respect as serious player in international politics, 61 in line with its self-perception as a growing economic and political power, 62 which is (partially) based on its oil revenues since the 2000s (Babayev in Reiter 2009, p. 83 ).
The Azerbaijani government has strengthened its narrative about the country's meaningful place in the international community. Government officials often refer to the country's (perceived) importance, particularly
Azerbaijan's 'strategic importance' for the EU. to sign the AA; in the Baku version, the EU put Azerbaijan in the position of having to reject it. 67 In a slightly different narrative, the government considered non-exclusive programmes with the EU, such as the AA, to be 'too low profile' 68 and believed that modernisation would be possible without EU support (Babayev 2014, p. 62 This self-representation may be one possible explanation for the EU's behaviour in relations with other actors, including Azerbaijan (Orbie 2008, p. 2) . It also translates into objectives that are often transformative and political in nature, among others: support for market economic reform and free trade; encouragement for WTO accession;
and promotion of democracy and human rights. As these are the underlying principles of the EU's own institutional project, Brussels is adamant to have these included to at least a certain extent in the agreements under negotiation with Azerbaijan, as they are seen as 'universal' values.
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The EU knows that Azerbaijan perceives itself as a stronger actor, but believes this to be misguided, mostly due to the lack of awareness of what the relationship has on offer. 70 Regarding the SMP specifically, the European Union argued that Strategic Partnerships would be exclusively reserved for great powers including Russia.
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The EU's willingness to negotiate the SPA in 2015, then, seems to be a U-turn. For the EU, the SMP was not acceptable but since negotiations over the SPA started in 2017, it seems that Brussels has acknowledged that it has no alternative but to negotiate with Azerbaijan. When asked about the reason for this changed attitude towards Azerbaijan's first and second proposed alternative agreement, one interviewee referred to the urge to update the PCA as well as the changed emphasis of the renewed European Neighbourhood Policy. Korosteleva et al. (2015) . We can observe different tendencies in the negotiations over time, and the question asked in this essay was, therefore, how can we explain these changing dynamics? To answer this question, the essay introduced a new model of 'bargaining power' to analyse the interactions and negotiation dynamics between Brussels and Baku.
It was found that bargaining power can be gained and lost quickly, and that five aspects are vital to explain
Azerbaijan's and the EU's behaviour in negotiations, and to assess their success in having their key interests
represented.
The first vital aspect is the power base of both actors, with both sides' bargaining power significantly affected by their economic performance. This seems to have led to a stronger position for the Azerbaijani government prior to 2015; but to a weakened stance after. In terms of negotiation skill and capacity, the second aspect, it was argued that while the EU is traditionally a strong and experienced negotiator, Azerbaijan has used its non-material resources in the smartest way possible to maximise its leverage. Regarding the domestic context of actors, the third aspect, for both the EU and the Azerbaijani government domestic constituents played a significant role in determining whether or not the proposed agreements were acceptable, especially in terms of values and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.. The fourth aspect of the bargaining power model is actors' perceptions of the Self and Other. Generally, both Brussels and Baku appear to feel that they hold the stronger position in negotiations or at least they keep up that appearance. These (mis)perceptions seem to stay firm across the different agreements that were negotiated. While other aspects of bargaining power have changed, and the perception of the Other has transformed over time as well, the perceptions of the Self (at least, those admitted to the outside world) appear remarkably constant. The last bargaining power dimension is the availability of alternative options. Here, both actors remained rather weak, since both agreed on the necessity of a follow-up agreement to the PCA. Neither Brussels nor Baku appear to have any significant alternatives, since Azerbaijan has declared it does not wish to join the EEU, and the EU had no other means to induce Azerbaijan to sign the AA.
Some would question that there have been any remarkable dynamics, and indeed, over the years there has been no significant change from the EU side: Brussels has consistently applied a policy based on a combination of strategic interests and values promotion (Youngs 2009 (Youngs , 2010 Kotzian et al. 2011 ) and has explicitly named this 'principled pragmatism' in the EU Global Strategy (EEAS 2016, p.16) . What this analysis has shown however, is that the situation is more nuanced and that there are more aspects to be considered than strategic interests alone: the non-material dimensions, such as domestic context and perceptions, matter more than often thought. Moreover, apart from factors influencing the EU's behaviour, including stability and continuity in its own policies, there has been considerable change on the other side, namely, in the approach and behaviour of the Azerbaijani government. Its increased bargaining power prior to 2015 led the government first, to reject the AA in 2013, and second, to propose an alternative agreement in 2013, which was unique in the history of EU external relations. Since 2015, as the foundation of Azerbaijan's bargaining power has been reduced somewhat, the government has had to make a number of concessions and has become more accommodating regarding the political dimension of the new agreement, which is what the EU desired. What we see, therefore, is that only viewing the EU perspective is insufficient: taking into consideration the Azerbaijani side of the story is crucial in understanding the dynamics in negotiations over the new legal agreement.
Naturally, over this period the EU remained the actor with most bargaining power. Given the sheer size of the EU and its market, Azerbaijan could not resist the EU's agenda altogether. However, in relative terms we have witnessed that, especially in the period 2013-2015, Azerbaijan has had significant bargaining power and that it has been able to challenge and resist the EU's proposed policies to an extent. Putting the negotiations in a broader perspective, one can see how remarkable and important Azerbaijan's contestations in this negotiation process have been, even if they have not (yet) led in full to the outcome desired by the government in Baku.
Overall, what the analysis of bargaining power made most clear, is that the negotiations over the AA, SMP and SPA are a relevant example of the changing power dynamics between the two sides. While back in the 1990s, the PCA was signed without any difficulties, it has since become a stronger actor with a clear agenda of its own. Baku's reluctance to sign the AA and the fact that it even proposed an alternative, show how the government perceived its own strength. Neither the EU nor Azerbaijan has, so far, had the offensive power to alter the agreements under negotiation to its own benefit; both had the defensive power to reject agreements that did not sufficiently meet their own interests. Nonetheless, that a relatively small country such as Azerbaijan can halt negotiations over such major agreement and can subsequently induce the EU to negotiate an alternative, is meaningful, even more so because Baku pointed out that it considers the lack of dialogical policy-making that it perceived as part of the AA, not acceptable.
What can we learn from the case of negotiations between the EU and Azerbaijan that is applicable to the broader region? On the one hand, Azerbaijan is perhaps not representative for the entire Eurasian region, given that the EU has clear transformative objectives in its relations with Azerbaijan. 83 The negotiation strategies used by the government in Baku are thus far also rare for the smaller states in the region. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is not unique in its resistance against a unilaterally set agenda, and there are indications that several countries in the region are becoming more assertive in applying their different (material and non-material) forms of power to enable themselves to co-shape relations with the EU and other actors. Following in Baku's footsteps, the Armenian government negotiated an individual, differentiated agreement in 2017 (EEAS 2017), and Moldovan President
Igor Dodon has stated that he wants to reconsider the AA signed by the country in 2014 (Hille & Buckley 2017) .
Belarus might request a similar pathway at a future date. What the Azerbaijani case has shown, is that the quest for dialogicism instead of unilateralism may be successful if countries can capitalise on their economic resources;
if they can use their negotiation skill in the most effective way possible; if their domestic constituents push for a clear discourse and strong demands; if the perceptions of the Self facilitates an assertive stance in international relations; and if there are alternative options available. The 'starting point' still seems to be a unilateral policy based on the EU's wish for cooperation, unless the partner state manages to influence the policy through its bargaining power. The question is whether all states in the Eurasian region can meet these conditions.
From the EU's side, this shift in power dynamics seems to be facilitated by the rethinking of its policies towards the neighbourhood, following its economic decline after 2008 and the awareness that previous governance strategies in relations with neighbouring countries were not successful. The 2015 review of the ENP envisaged more differentiation (European Commission 2015b), and the European Commission installed in 2015 appears to be more pragmatic in determining the foundations for relations with the Eurasian region. The more pragmatic approach does bring along an important moral issue, in that key values of the EU may be (partially) sacrificed for the sake of cooperation. Change can be expected, but all sides will have to engage in lengthy negotiations over the final outcomes.
